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Abstract
We analyse sequential entry in a quantity-setting oligopoly model. Firms
have the option to adopt either a productive capacity which is optimal at the
time of entry or a smaller one. This capacity may be suitable either for the
steady state or just some time after entry. In the latter case …rms never carry
idle capacity, while in the former they keep spare capacity in the steady state.
In the Cournot-Nash setting, a subgame perfect equilibrium may result in
…rms investing in capacity that will turn out to be idle later, depending on
the size of the market and the rental price of capital. Older …rms have larger
spare capacity than later entrants and we can tell the age of a …rm from its
unused capacity. If market size is large enough, excess capacity turns out to
be socially optimal.
JEL Classi…cation: L13.
Keywords: Oligopoly, sequential entry, idle capacity.
1 Introduction
Casual observation points to industries made up of …rms of di¤erent size.
The existing literature explains this stylized fact either through R&D races or
through the description of the dynamic evolution of an industry. The former
view relies upon either cost or quality di¤erentials across …rms, generated
by R&D activities in process or product innovation (see Reinganum, 1989;
Shaked and Sutton, 1983: Lehmann-Grube, 1997, inter alia). The latter
view integrates demand and supply factors, with and without uncertainty
(see Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Fishman and
Rob, 1995, 1999). Our contribution nests into this strand of literature, by
relating the evolution of the industry to the issue of whether …rms have the
incentive to hold excess capacity in the long-run equilibrium. This question
has received a considerable amount of attention in modelling entry barriers
in static multi-stage models. However, to our knowledge, it hasn’t yet been
investigated in a model where entry takes place over an arbitrarily long time
span.
In this vein, strategic investment in productive capacity remains quite an
open question with reference to a framework of sequential entry in oligopoly.
The two main issues at stake are a) the social e¢ciency of the entry process,
and b) the incentive for …rms to hold excess capacity. When there are set-up
costs the ine¢ciency of entry is mainly due to accomodation by incumbents
refraining from price competition. As a result the reduction of the output
level of incumbent …rms (the “business stealing e¤ect”) makes entry more
desirable to new entrants than to society (von Weizsäcker, 1980; Perry, 1984;
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Nachbar, Petersen and Hwang, 1998). A sec-
ond strand of literature is devoted to the use of idle capacity as a strategic
device by incumbent …rms. The early contribution on this topic (Spence,
1977) claims that incumbents may install excess capacity to prevent entry.
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Subsequently, Dixit (1979, 1980) shows that this procedure is not consistent,
since investing in idle capacity cannot be a credible threat, i.e., Spence’s equi-
librium is not subgame perfect. A later development in this direction rescues
Spence’s contribution by relating the incentive to hold excess physical cap-
ital to the slope of the best reply functions of …rms in the market subgame
(Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985). When reaction functions are
positively sloped, i.e. there is strategic complementarity among products,
we observe redundant capital commitment in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Dixit’s conclusion holds for strategic substitutability.
A more recent strand of literature has dealt with entry deterrence in
an uncertain environment. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1992) …nd that higher
volatility in an uncertain market leads …rms to invest earlier and to commit to
higher capacity. Hopenhayn (1992) develops a stochastic model of entry and
exit, where uncertainty is technological and …rm-speci…c and …rms’ turnover
takes place also in the steady state. Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) again
point to excessive capacity when demand is not certain. A similar conclusion
can be found in Maskin (1999) who …nds that excessive capacity occurs as an
entry deterrence strategy under either technological or market uncertainty
in a Cournot setting. On the contrary, Somma (1999) shows that a lower
commitment is preferred when there is a high probability that a more e¢cient
technology may appear in the second period.
Our purpose is to investigate a dynamic entry process. We assess the
incentive for …rms, selling a homogeneous good, to invest in excess capacity
in a model where entry takes place over time. In this respect we depart
from a large literature where entry is analysed in timeless models without
discounting (Prescott and Visscher, 1977; Boyer and Moreaux, 1986; Eaton
and Ware, 1987; Vives, 1988; Anderson and Engers, 1994).
We consider sequential entry, with a single …rm entering the market at
each period, in continuous time. When the role of real time is properly taken
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into account, …rms have the option to install a capacity which ranges between
the capacity that is optimal at the time of entry and the capacity they foresee
will be optimal in the steady state. If they adopt a capacity that is strictly
larger than the one of the steady state they will be capacity constrained from
the time of entry to the time at which their capacity will be optimal. From
then on they operate with unused capital.
We evaluate the capacity decisions under the solution concept of the
standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Each period incumbents and entrants
set quantities simultaneously in a market characterised by strategic substi-
tutability. We establish that …rms adopt a capacity which depends upon the
cost of capital, the size of the market and the past history of entry. No …rm
enters with a capacity which is redundant at the time of entry. Idle capacity
surfaces later as they come closer to the steady state. Unlike what happens
in Spence (1977), the emergence of idle capacity in the long run equilibrium
is due to the incentive to exploit the temporary rent which dissipates as we
approach the steady state. Therefore, if in the long run equilibrium …rms
adopt excess capacity, then the size of a …rm’s installed capital is inversely
related to the date of entry, revealing thus the …rm’s age.
Consumers’ welfare maximization is not always against excess capacity.
Especially, when market size is relatively large excess capacity is equivalent
to accelerating the path to the steady state where pro…ts will be zero and
consumers shall get the most out of the entry process.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we provide
the basic setup for sequential entry models. In section 3 we analyse Cournot-
Nash behaviour. In section 4 we go through second best welfare analysis. The
results are summarised in section 5.
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2 The set up
Consider a quantity-setting oligopoly, over continuous time t 2 [0;1): Entry
takes place sequentially over continuous time t 2 [0; ¿ ]; where ¿ is the time at
which the market reaches the steady state where the last entrant just breaks
even. That is, the steady state is reached at time ¿ when the …rm ¿ + 1’s
discounted ‡ow of operative pro…ts just covers the cost of capital acquired at
time ¿ ; de…ned as k¿ : In each period t a single …rm t+ 1 2 [1; ¿ + 1] enters
the market with a capacity kt+h which is at least as large as the steady
state capacity, k¿ ; and weakly lower than the optimal capacity at the time
of entry, k¤t , for all t < ¿ : Without loss of generality, we assume that capital
does not depreciate over time. Our framework is one of perfect information
and certainty.
We assume that …rms produce a homogeneous good at a constant unit cost
c; as long as individual production does not exceed capacity. Otherwise, we
suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that the marginal cost becomes in…nitely
large. At any time t the inverse market demand is:
pt = max f0; a¡Qng (1)
where n = t + 1 is the number of …rms in the market at time t: Each …rm
has the option to choose its capital endowment kt+h 2 [k¿ ; k¤t ] : For any …rm
entering at t 2 [0; ¿ ); we have that k¿ < k¤t : From t to t + h; …rm i = t + 1
that adopts kt+h is capacity constrained. Over t 2 [t+ h;1); the …rm plays
her best reply against the overall quantity produced by rivals:
qiz =
8<: kt+h 8 z 2 [t; t+ h]q¤iz (Q¡i;z) 8 z 2 [t+ h;1) (2)
Notice that, at time t+ h; q¤iz (Q¡i;z) = kt+h: Moreover, from ¿ onwards,
q¤iz (Q¡i;z) = q
¤
iz (¿q
¤
¿) = q
¤
¿ : For the last …rm entering the market at time ¿;
the optimal choice is obviously to set up the steady state capacity k¿ :
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De…ne:
² The instantaneous operative pro…t over z 2 [t; t+ h] accruing to …rm i
entering at time t 2 [0; ¿ ] as
¼iz ´ (pz ¡ c)qiz = (a¡ kt+h ¡Q¡i;z ¡ c)kt+h: The population of earlier
entrants in general is composed partly by capacity constrained …rms
and partly by other …rms which can play their best replies, i.e.:
Q¡i;z =
mX
j=1
qj +
zX
l=m+1
kl ; j 6= i : (3)
For later reference, de…ne Kl ´ Pzl=m+1 kl :
² The instantaneous operative pro…t over v 2 (t+ h; ¿ ] accruing to …rm
i entered at time t 2 [0; ¿ ] as
¼iv ´ (pv ¡ c)qiv = (a ¡ qiv ¡ Q¡i;v ¡ c)qiv: The population of later
entrants in general is composed partly by capacity constrained …rms
and partly by other …rms which can play their best replies, i.e.:
Q¡i;v =
uX
j=1
qj +
vX
w=u+1
kw ; j 6= i : (4)
For later reference, de…ne Kw ´ Pvw=u+1 kw :
² N = ¿+1 as the number of …rms in the steady state, hence i; n 2 [1;N ]:
² ¼ss = (a ¡ Nk¿ ¡ c)k¿ as the steady state operative pro…t of a single
…rm, over t 2 (¿ ;1):
² ½ as the discount rate, equal across …rms and constant over time. The
same discounting belongs to the social planner. The rental price of
capital is also equal to ½:
² s ´ a¡ c as the net size of the market (de…ned by Dixit (1979) as net
absolute advantage when referred to a single …rm).
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² The number of …rms entered up to ¿ is ¿ + 1: Therefore, steady state
capacity is k¿ = s=(¿ + 2):
3 Firms’ behaviour
The discounted ‡ow of pro…ts accruing to …rm i = t+1; entering at t 2 [0; ¿ ];
over the period [t;1) is given by:
¦t+1;t(k) =
Z t+h
t
¼iz ¢e¡½zdz+
Z ¿
t+h
¼iv ¢e¡½vdv+
Z 1
¿
¼ss ¢e¡½rdr¡½kt+h ; (5)
where kt+h 2 [k¿ ; kt(Kl)] :
Notice that, over t 2 (¿;1) ; all …rms play k¿ : Therefore, the choice of
kt+h is una¤ected by the discounted ‡ow of pro…ts from steady state onwards,R1
¿ ¼ss ¢ e¡½rdr; which we disregard in the remainder. As a result, the …rm’s
choice of capital installment is de…ned as follows:
k¤t+h = argmax
kt+h
b¦t+1;t(k) = Z t+h
t
¼iz ¢ e¡½zdz +
Z ¿
t+h
¼iv ¢ e¡½vdv ¡ ½kt+h (6)
where b¦t+1;t(k) = ¦t+1;t(k)¡ R1¿ ¼ss ¢ e¡½tdt: We prove the following:
Lemma 1 Firm i’s pro…ts are:Z t+h
t
¼iz ¢ e¡½zdz =
µ
s¡Kl
m+ 1
¶
kt+h
Z t+h
t
e¡½zdz ; (7)
over z 2 [t; t+ h] ; andZ ¿
t+h
¼iv ¢ e¡½vdv =
µ
s¡Kw
u+ 1
¶2 Z ¿
t+h
e¡½vdv ; (8)
over v 2 (t+ h; ¿ ] :
Proof. Consider the …rst part of the Lemma. A …rm which, at any z 2
[t; t+ h] ; is not capacity constrained, produces the output qjz given by the
solution of the following …rst order condition (FOC):
@¼jz
@qjz
= s¡ 2qjz ¡
m¡1X
j=1
qjz ¡K = 0 ; (9)
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i.e., q¤jz(K) = (s¡K)=(m+1); where K = Kl+kt+h is the overall capacity of
the subpopulation of …rms which are capacity constrained at time z: Plugging
q¤jz(K) into
R t+h
t ¼iz ¢e¡½zdz and simplifying, proves the …rst statement in the
Lemma.
Now consider the second statement. Over v 2 (t+ h; ¿ ] ; …rm i (entered
at t) is no longer constrained, and, at any v, maximises instantaneous pro…ts
¼iv =
"
2 (s¡Kw)
u+ 1
¡ qiv
#
qiv (10)
by playing the best reply q¤iz(Kw) = (s ¡ Kw)=(u + 1): This yields optimal
instantaneous pro…ts ¼¤iv [q
¤
iz(Kw)] = (s¡Kw)2 = (u+ 1)2 : This completes
the proof.
On the basis of Lemma 1, we can write b¦t+1;t(k) as follows:
b¦t+1;t(k) = (s¡Kl ¡ kt+h)
³
e½(t+h) ¡ e½t
´
kt+h
½ (m+ 1) e½(2t+h)
+
+
³
e½¿ ¡ e½(t+h)
´
(s¡Kw)2
½ (u+ 1)2 e½(t+h+¿)
¡ ½kt+h
(11)
which can be di¤erentiated w.r.t. kt+h to obtain the following FOC:
@ b¦t+1;t(k)
@kt+h
=
(s¡Kl ¡ 2kt+h)
³
e½(t+h) ¡ e½t
´
½ (m+ 1) e½(2t+h)
¡ ½ = 0 (12)
whose solution is:1
k¤t+h =
(s¡Kl)
2
¡ ½
2e½(t+h)(m+ 1)
2 (e½h ¡ 1) : (13)
1The second order condition for a maximum:
@2b¦t+1;t(k)
@k2t+h
= ¡ 2
¡
e½(t+h) ¡ e½t¢
½ (m + 1) e½(2t+h)
is always met.
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From (13), it appears that for the …rst …rm, entering at t = 0; capacity is de-
termined exclusively by the size of the market and intertemporal discounting.
This produces a viability condition for the entry process to start:
Lemma 2 The necessary condition for the entry process to start with …rm
1 choosing k¤h is s > s
0 =
½2e½h
e½h ¡ 1 :
Proof. For the …rst …rm, Kl is necessarily nil. Moreover, t = 0: Plugging
these values in (13), we obtain the expression for the capacity of …rm 1, k¤h: It
is then immediate to verify that this capital level is positive if s >
½2e½h
e½h ¡ 1 :
Before proceeding to establish optimum conditions for the choice of ca-
pacity, observe that:
Lemma 3 Choosing k¿ at the time of entry is admissible for all s > 0:
Proof. To prove this claim, it su¢ces to check that
k¿ =
s
¿ + 2
· s for all ¿ + 1 ¸ 0 (14)
which is always true.
Su¢cient conditions for the optimal choice of capacity by the generic …rm
t+ 1 are stated in the following:
Proposition 1 For any ½ > 0; there exists a threshold value of the market
size es > s0 > 0; such that:
² for all s > es; maximum pro…ts obtain at k¤t+h > k¿ ;
² for all s 2 [0; es] ; maximum pro…ts obtain at k¿ :
For all positive values of ½ and s; k¤t+h < kt (Kl) ; where kt (Kl) is the
capacity that …rm t+ 1 would choose as a best reply against Kl :
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Proof. Compare (13) with k¿ = s=(¿ + 2): This yields:
k¤t+h
>
=
<
k¿ for all s
>
=
<
h
Kl
³
e½h ¡ 1
´
+ ½2e½(t+h)(m+ 1)
i
(¿ + 2)
¿ (e½h ¡ 1) ´ es : (15)
The inequality es > s0 can be checked by plugging Kl = 0 and m = 0 into es
and comparing it against s0 as from Lemma 2. This proves the …rst part of
the Proposition.
To prove the second statement we compare k¤t+h with
kt (Kl) =
s¡Kl
2
=
s¡ Pzl=m+1 kl
2
(16)
to obtain:
kt (Kl)¡ k¤t+h =
½2e½(t+h)(m+ 1)
2 (e½h ¡ 1) > 0 : (17)
Notice that, when s 2 [0; es] ; …rms choose k¿ irrespective of whether s is
larger or smaller than s0: For all s 2 [0; s0) ; …rms never choose k¤t+h as it is
both suboptimal and too large w.r.t. the size of the market; for all s 2 [s0; es] ;
k¤t+h is admissible but suboptimal.
Proposition 1 produces a few relevant corollaries. The …rst is the follow-
ing:
Corollary 1 Optimal capacity k¤t+h only depends upon the past history of the
entry process.
To prove it, just observe expression (13), which depends on Kl but not
on Kw; i.e., the generic …rm’s capital commitment at date t is determined by
the overall capacity accumulated by earlier entrants.
Now we assess the behaviour of k¤t+h as t increases towards ¿; in order
to characterise the time pattern of excess capacity as the market approaches
the steady state. This is summarised in the following:
9
Proposition 2 For all s > es; optimal capacity k¤t+h is everywhere decreasing
and concave in t:
Proof. To prove the above statement, just calculate …rst and second deriv-
atives of k¤t+h w.r.t. t :
@k¤t+h
@t
= ¡½
3(m+ 1)e½(t+h)
2 (e½h ¡ 1) < 0 ; (18)
@2k¤t+h
@t2
= ¡½
4(m+ 1)e½(t+h)
2 (e½h ¡ 1) < 0 : (19)
The intuition attached to Proposition 2 is that a casual observer looking
at the market in steady state is able to tell older …rms from younger …rms
simply by looking at their respective installed capacities.
4 Second best welfare analysis
Here we assess the behaviour of a planner w.r.t. capital commitment kt+h;
given …rms’ output decisions at the market stage, as given by (2). To this
aim, we calculate the social welfare levels over the periods [t; t + h] and
(t+ h; ¿ ] :
SW (t; t+ h) =
(Kl + kt+h) (2s¡Kl ¡ kt+h) +ms2(m+ 2)
2(m+ 1)2
; (20)
SW (t+ h; ¿ ) =
Kw (2s¡Kw) + us2(u+ 2)
2(u+ 1)2
: (21)
The planner would choose kt+h so as to maximise social welfare over the
whole time horizon up to the steady state, i.e., SW (t; ¿) = SW (t; t + h) +
SW (t+ h; ¿ ): The FOC is:
@SW (t; ¿)
@kt+h
=
(s¡Kl ¡ kt+h)
³
e½h ¡ 1
´
½(m+ 1)2e½(t+h)
¡ ½ = 0 ; (22)
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yielding2
ksbt+h =
(s¡Kl)
³
e½h ¡ 1
´
¡ ½2(m+ 1)2e½(t+h)
e½h ¡ 1 : (23)
It is easily veri…ed that
@ksbt+h
@t
< 0 and
@2ksbt+h
@t2
< 0 (24)
so that ksbt+h is everywhere decreasing and concave in t:
It remains to assess whether the per-…rm capital endowment (23) in the
second best equilibrium is larger than the privately optimal capital (13). This
is done in the following:
Proposition 3 For any ½ > 0; there exists a threshold value of the market
size bs > 0; such that:
² for all s > bs; we have ksbt+h > k¤t+h ;
² for all s 2 (0; bs) ; we have ksbt+h < k¤t+h :
Proof. Compare (23) with (13). This yields:
ksbt+h ¡ k¤t+h =
(s¡Kl)
³
e½h ¡ 1
´
¡ ½2(2m+ 1)(m+ 1)e½(t+h)
2 (e½h ¡ 1) (25)
which is positive if
s >
Kl
³
e½h ¡ 1
´
+ ½2(2m+ 1)(m+ 1)e½(t+h)
(e½h ¡ 1) ´ bs ; (26)
and conversely if s 2 (0; bs) : This concludes the proof.
2The SOC
@2SW (t; ¿)
@k2t+h
= ¡ e
½h ¡ 1
½(m + 1)2e½(t+h)
· 0
is always met.
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Observe that the above result can be reformulated in terms of residual
market demand, by noting that
ksbt+h > k
¤
t+h i¤ s¡Kl >
½2(2m+ 1)(m+ 1)e½(t+h)
(e½h ¡ 1) ; (27)
where s ¡ Kl is the size of the residual market at time t; when capacity-
constrained …rms have installed an overall capacity Kl:
Moreover, we wish to investigate the parameter regions where second best
social welfare is maximised alternatively at ksbt+h or k¿ . This establishes the
following
Proposition 4 For any ½ > 0; there exists a threshold value of the market
size, s > 0; such that:
² for all s > s; max
n
SW sb
o
obtains at ksbt+h ;
² for all s 2 (0; s) ; max
n
SW sb
o
obtains at k¿ :
Proof. To prove the above statement compare (23) with k¿ to obtain the
following
ksbt+h
>
=
<
k¿ for all s
>
=
<
h
Kl
³
e½h ¡ 1
´
+ ½2e½(t+h)(m+ 1)2
i
(¿ + 2)
(¿ + 1) (e½h ¡ 1) ´ s : (28)
We now wish to establish a ranking over fs; es; bsg :
Proposition 5 For all Kl > K 0l ; we have s > es > bs; for all Kl 2 (0; K 0l) ;
we have s < es < bs:
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Proof. Simply observe that the critical level of Kl; at which s = es = bs ; is:
K 0l =
½2e½(t+h)(m+ 1)(m¿ ¡ 1)
e½h ¡ 1 : (29)
We are now in a position to give a comparative picture of the planner’s
preferences over the entry process, vis à vis the …rms’ behaviour.
Theorem 1 Suppose Kl > K 0l : Then we have
A] s > s, ksbt+h > k
¤
t+h > k¿ : The planner chooses k
sb
t+h; …rms choose k
¤
t+h:
B] s 2 (es; s); the planner chooses k¿ while …rms adopt k¤t+h:
C] s 2 (0; es); both the planner and …rms choose k¿ :
Suppose Kl 2 (0; K 0l) : Then we have
D] s > bs, ksbt+h > k¤t+h > k¿ : The planner chooses ksbt+h; …rms choose k¤t+h:
E] s 2 (es; bs); k¤t+h > ksbt+h > k¿ : The planner chooses ksbt+h; …rms choose k¤t+h:
F] s 2 (s; es); the planner chooses ksbt+h; …rms choose k¿ :
G] s 2 (0; s); both the planner and …rms choose k¿ :
Proof. The Theorem is a direct consequence of Propositions 1, 3 and 4. As
an illustration, we con…ne our attention to points [A, B, C]. Consider the
case Kl > K 0l : Suppose s > s: If so, Propositions 1, 3 and 4 establish that
both the planner and the …rms choose excess capacity, with social incentives
towards excess capacity being larger than private incentives. This proves [A].
Now take s 2 (es; s): In this range, Proposition 4 tells that the planner
would like …rms to adopt steady state capacity. However, Proposition 1 leads
…rms to choose k¤t+h > k¿ : This proves [B].
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Finally, consider s 2 (0; es): In this range, Propositions 1 and 4 entail that
it is both socially and privately optimal to choose k¿ : This proves [C].
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as a description of the tradeo¤ between the
cost of capacity on one side and the e¤ect of larger capacity on market price,
outputs and surplus on the other side. As an illustration, consider points [A,
B, C]. If the market is very small, then both private and social incentives
point to the adoption of the steady state capacity. Since surplus is quadratic
in market size, in such a range it is more desirable to save on installment
costs. The opposite holds if the market is su¢ciently large. If so, then excess
capacity is appealing also to the planner, as the temporary gain in welfare
more than o¤sets the cost of idle capital in the ensuing story of the industry.
Finally, notice that, when the incentive to adopt excess capacity exists for
the planner, then it is higher than for …rms, due to the fact that the planner
takes into account the sum of industry pro…ts and consumer surplus.
5 Concluding remarks
In a static quantity-setting framework, the only reasonable solution concept
is the Nash equilibrium, in that there is no reason to expect that any …rm
may have an unchallenged ability to move …rst. This is the major result
proved by d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1980) and Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990). Therefore, when an entry process is described in a single period
model, it is not rational for …rms to operate with excess capacity. This is the
basic objection to Spence’s (1977) conclusion raised by Dixit (1980).
In the light of the foregoing analysis, this conclusion may change when
entry takes place sequentially in continuous time.
Firms install a capacity which ranges between the one that is optimal at
the time of entry and the one that is best suited for the steady state when
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a zero pro…t condition dictates operative scale of production. The choice
of capacity depends upon the cost of capital, the net size of the market
(reservation price minus marginal cost) and the past history of entry in the
market.
We are able to …nd threshold values of the market size beyond which
…rms enter with a productive capacity that will be partly idle after a while
and in the steady state. For a constant cost of capital and a given net size
of market, we are able to tell the age of …rms from their capacity, since older
…rms are more likely to carry excess capacity in the steady state, due to their
incentive to extract as much surplus as possible in their very …rst stay in the
market. Younger …rms enter with a capacity that will be much closer to the
one they will use in the steady state where they will carry less idle capacity.
Second best welfare analysis provides a thorough assessment of the entry
process. In particular, if market size is large enough, then both private and
social incentives point to the adoption of excess capacity. Moreover, the
socially preferred result is for …rms to enter with larger capacity than it
would be privately optimal.
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